The Happiness Hypothesis
Finding Modern Truth in Ancient Wisdom

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you prepare your own matching disclosure, but some other part of you resists sharing intimate details with a near-stranger. But when it’s played at the right time, the past-relationships-mutual-disclosure conversation can be a memorable turning point on the road to love.

Reciprocity is an all-purpose relationship tonic. Used properly, it strengthens, lengths, and rejuvenates social ties. It works so well in part because the elephant is a natural mimic. For example, when we interact with someone we like, we have a slight tendency to copy their every move, automatically and unconsciously. If the other person taps her foot, you are more likely to tap yours. If she touches her face, you are more likely to touch yours. But it’s not just that we mimic those we like; we like those who mimic us. People who are subtly mimicked are then more helpful and agreeable toward their mimicker, and even toward others.29 Waitresses who mimic their customers get larger tips.30

Mimicry is a kind of social glue, a way of saying “We are one.” The unifying pleasures of mimicry are particularly clear in synchronized activities, such as line dances, group cheers, and some religious rituals, in which people try to do the same thing at the same time. A theme of the rest of this book is that humans are partially hive creatures, like bees, yet in the modern world we spend nearly all our time outside of the hive. Reciprocity, like love, reconnects us with others.

The Faults of Others

Why do you see the speck in your neighbor’s eye, but do not notice the log in your own eye? ... You hypocrite, first take the log out of your own eye, and then you will see clearly to take the speck out of your neighbor’s eye.

—Matthew 7:3–5

It is easy to see the faults of others, but difficult to see one’s own faults. One shows the faults of others like chaff winnowed in the wind, but one conceals one’s own faults as a cunning gambler conceals his dice.

—Buddha

It’s fun to laugh at a hypocrite, and recent years have given Americans a great deal to laugh at. Take the conservative radio show host Rush Limbaugh, who once said, in response to the criticism that the United States prosecutes a disproportionate number of black men for drug crimes, that white drug users should be seized and “sent up the river,” too. In 2003, he was forced to eat his words when Florida officials discovered his illegal purchase of massive quantities of Oxycontin, a painkiller also known as “hillbilly heroin.” Another case occurred in my home state of Virginia. Congressman Ed Schrock was an outspoken opponent of gay rights, gay marriage, and of
gays serving in the military. Speaking of the horrors of such cosmo-nice, he said, "I mean, they are in the showers with you, they are in the dining hall with you." In August 2004, audio tapes were made public of the messages that Schrock, a married man, had left on Megamates, an interactive phone sex line. Schrock described the anatomical features of the kind of man he was seeking, along with the acts he was interested in performing.

There is a special pleasure in the irony of a moralist brought down for the very moral failings he has condemned. It's the reward of a well-told joke. Some jokes are funny as one-liners, but must require three verses: three gags, say, who walk into a bar one at a time, or a priest, a minister, and a rabbi in a liftboat. The first two set the pattern, and the third violates it. With hypocrisy, the hypocrite's preaching is the setup, the hypocritical action is the punch line. Scandal is great entertainment because it allows people to feel contempt, a moral emotion that gives feelings of moral superiority while asking nothing in return. With contempt you don't need to right the wrong (as with anger) or flee the scene (as with fear or disgust). And best of all, contempt is made to share. Stories about the moral failings of others are among the most common kinds of gossip, they are a staple of talk radio, and they offer a ready way for people to show that they share a common moral orientation. Sell an acquaintance a cynical story that ends with both of you smirking and shaking your heads and valla, you've got a bond.

Well, stop smirking. One of the most universal pieces of advice from across cultures and eras is that we are all hypocrites, and in our condemnation of others' hypocrisy we only compound our own. Social psychologists have recently isolated the mechanisms that make us blind to the lies in our own eyes. The moral implications of these findings are disturbing, indeed, they challenge our greatest moral certainties. But the implications can be liberating, too, freeing you from destructive moralism and divisive self-righteousness.

**Keeping Up Appearances**

Research on the evolution of altruism and cooperation has relied heavily on studies in which several people (or people simulated on a computer) play a game. On each round of play, one person interacts with one other player and can choose to be cooperative (cooperatively expanding the pie they then share) or greedy (each grabbing as much as possible for himself). After many rounds of play, you come up the number of points each player accumulated and see which strategy was most profitable in the long run. In these games, which are intended to be simple models of the game of life, no strategy ever beats tit for tat. Thus, "In the long run and across a variety of environments, it pays to cooperate while remaining vigilant to the danger of being cheated. But these simple games are in some ways simple minded. Players face a binary choice at each point; they can cooperate or defect. Each player then reacts to what the other player did to the previous round. In real life, however, you don't react to what someone did; you react only to what you think she did, and the gap between action and perception is bridged by the art of impression management. If life itself is but what you deem it, then why not focus your efforts on persuading others to believe that you are a virtuous and trustworthy cooperateur? This Niccolo Machiavelli, whose name has become synonymous with the cunning and savagely use of power, wrote five hundred years ago that "the great majority of mankind are satisfied with appearances, as though they were realities, and are often more influenced by the things that seem than by those that are." Natural selection, like politics, works by the principle of survival of the fittest, and several researchers have argued that human beings evolved to play the game of life in a Machiavellian way. The Machiavellian version of tit for tat, for example, is to do all you can to cultivate the reputation of a trustworthy yet vigilant partner, whatever the reality may be.

The simplest way to cultivate a reputation for being fair is to really be fair, but life and psychology experiments sometimes force us to choose between appearance and reality. Dan Batson at the University of Kansas devised a clever way to make people choose, and his findings are not pretty.

He brought students into his lab one at a time to take part in what they thought was a study of how unequal rewards affect teamwork. The procedure was explained. One member of each team of two will be rewarded for correct responses to questions with a raffle ticket that could win a valuable price. The other member will receive nothing. Subjects were also told that an additional part of the experiment concerned the effects of control. You,
the subject, will decide which of you is rewarded, which of you is not. Your partner is already here, in another room, and the two of you will not meet. Your partner will be told that the decision was made by chance. You can make the decision in any way you like. Oh, and here is a coin: Most people in this study seem to think that flipping the coin is the fairest way to make the decision.

Subjects were then left alone to choose. About half of them used the coin. Batson knows this because the coin was wrapped in a plastic bag, and half the bags were ripped open. Of those who did not flip the coin, 90 percent chose the positive task for themselves. For those who did flip the coin, the laws of probability were suspended and 90 percent of them chose the positive task for themselves. Batson had given all the subjects a variety of questionnaires about morality weeks earlier (the subjects were students in psychology classes), so he was able to check how various measures of moral personality predicted behavior. His finding: People who reported being most concerned about caring for others and about issues of social responsibility were more likely to open the bag, but they were not more likely to give the other person the positive task. In other words, people who think they are particularly moral are in fact more likely to "do the right thing" and flip the coin, but when the coin flip comes out against them, they find a way to ignore it and follow their own self-interest. Batson called this tendency to value the appearance of morality over the reality "moral hypocrisy."

Batson’s subjects who flipped the coin reported (on a questionnaire) that they had made the decision in an ethical way. After his first study, Batson wondered whether perhaps people tricked themselves by not stating clearly what heads or tails would mean ("Let’s see, heads, that means, um, oh yeah, I get the good one."). But when he labeled the two sides of the coin to erase ambiguity, it made no difference. Placing a large mirror in the room, right in front of the subject, and at the same time stressing the importance of fairness in the instructions, was the only manipulation that had an effect. When people were forced to think about fairness and could see themselves cheating, they stopped doing it. As Jesus and Buddha said in the opening epigraphs of this chapter, it is easy to spot a cheater when our eyes are looking outward, but hard when looking inward. Folk wisdom from around the world concurs:

Though you see the seven defects of others, we do not see our own ten defects. (Japanese proverb)

A lie-goat doesn’t realize that he smells. (Nigerian proverb)

Proving that people are selfish, or that they will sometimes cheat when they know they won’t be caught, seems like a good way to get an article into the Journal of Incredibly Obvious Results. What’s not so obvious is that, in nearly all these studies, people don’t think they are doing anything wrong. It’s the same in real life. From the person who cuts you off on the highway all the way to the Nazis who ran the concentration camps, most people think they are good people and that their actions are motivated by good reasons. Machiavellian tit for tat requires devotion to appearances, including protestations of one’s virtue even when one chooses vice. And such protestations are most effective when the person making them really believes them. As Robert Wright put it in his masterful book The Moral Animal, “Human beings are a species splendihed in their array of moral equipment, tragic in their propensity to misuse it, and pathetic in their constitutional ignorance of the misuse.”

If Wright is correct about our “constitutional ignorance” of our hypocrisy, then the sages’ admonition to stop sinning may be no more effective than telling a depressed person to snap out of it. You can’t change your mental filters by willpower alone; you have to engage in activities such as meditation or cognitive therapy that train the elephant. But at least a depressed person will usually admit she’s depressed. Curing hypocrisy is much harder because part of the problem is that we don’t believe there’s a problem. We are well-armed for battle in a Machiavellian world of reputation manipulation, and one of our most important weapons is the delusion that we are noncombatants. How do we get away with it?

**Find Your Inner Lawyer**

Remember Julie and Mark, the sister and brother who had sex back in chapter 1? Most people condemned their actions as ven in the absence of harm,
Harvard psychologist who has devoted his career to improving reasoning, found the same thing. He says that thinking generally uses the “makesense” stopping rule. We take a position, look for evidence that supports it, and if we find some evidence—enough to that our position “makes sense”—we stop thinking. But at least in a low-pressure situation such as this, if someone else brings up reasons and evidence on the other side, people can be induced to change their minds; they just don’t make an effort to do such thinking for themselves.

Now let’s crank up the pressure. The client has been caught cheating on her taxes. She calls her lawyer. She doesn’t confess and ask, “Was that OK?” She says, “Do something.” The lawyer bolts into action, assesses the damaging evidence, researches precedents and loopholes, and figures out how some personal expenses might be plausibly justified as business expenses. The lawyer has been given an order: Use all your powers to defend me. Studies of “motivated reasoning” show that people who are motivated to reach a particular conclusion are even worse reasoners than those in Kuhn’s and Perkins’s studies, but the mechanism is basically the same: a one-sided search for supporting evidence only. People who are told that they have performed poorly on a test of social intelligence think extra hard to find reasons to discount the test; people who are asked to read a study showing that one of their habits—such as drinking coffee—is unhealthy think extra hard to find flaws in the study; flaws who people who don’t drink coffee don’t notice. Over and over again, studies show that people set out on a cognitive mission to bring back reasons to support their preferred belief or action. And because we are usually successful in this mission, we end up with the illusion of objectivity. We really believe that our position is rationally and objectively justified.

Ben Franklin, as usual, was wise to our tricks. But he showed unusual insight in catching himself in the act. Though he had been a vegetarian on principle, on one long sea crossing the men were grilling fish, and his mouth started watering.

I balanced some time between principle and inclination, till I recollected that, when the fish were opened, I saw smaller fish taken out of their stomachs; then thought I, “If you eat one another, I don’t see why we
mayn't eat you." So I did'd upon cod very heartily, and continued to eat with other people, returning only now and then occasionally to a vegetable diet. 14

Franklin concluded: "So convenient a thing it is to be a reasonable creature, since it enables one to find or make a reason for every thing one has a mind to do."

**The Rose-Colored Mirror**

I don't want to blame everything on the lawyer. The lawyer is, after all, the rider—your conscious, reasoning self—and he is taking orders from the elephant—your automatic and unconscious self. The two are in cahoots to win at the game of life by playing Machiavellian tit for tat, and both are in denial about it.

To win at this game you must present your best possible self to others. You must appear virtuous, whether or not you are, and you must gain the benefits of cooperation whether or not you deserve them. But everyone else is playing the same game, so you must also play defense—you must be wary of others' self-presentations, and of their efforts to claim more for themselves than they deserve. Social life is therefore always a game of social comparison. We must compare ourselves to other people, and our actions to their actions, and we must somehow spin those comparisons in our favor. (In depression, part of the illness is that spin goes the other way, as described by Aaron Beck's cognitive triad: I'm bad, the world is terrible, and my future is bleak.) You can spin a comparison either by inflating your own claims or by disparaging the claims of others. You might expect, given what I've said so far, that we do both, but the consistent finding of psychological research is that we are fairly accurate in our perceptions of others. It's our self-perceptions that are distorted because we look at ourselves in a rose-colored mirror.

In Garrison Keillor's mythical town of Lake Wobegon, all the women are strong, all the men good looking, and all the children above average. But if the Wobegonians were real people, they would go further. Most of them would believe they were stronger, better looking, or smarter than the average Wobegonian. When Americans and Europeans are asked to rate themselves on virtues, skills, or other desirable traits (including intelligence, driving ability, sexual skills, and ethics), a large majority say they are above average. 15 (This effect is weaker in East Asian countries, and may not exist in Japan.) 16

In a brilliant series of experiments, Nick Epley and David Dunning figured out how we do it. They asked students at Cornell University to predict how many flowers they would buy in an upcoming charity event and how many the average Cornell student would buy. Then they looked at actual behavior. People had greatly overestimated their own virtue, but were pretty close on their guesses about others. In a second study, Epley and Dunning asked people to predict what they would do in a game that could be played for money either selfishly or cooperatively. Same findings: Eighty-four percent predicted that they'd cooperate, but the subjects expected (on average) that only 64 percent of others would cooperate. When they ran the real game, 61 percent cooperated. In a third study, Epley and Dunning paid people five dollars for participating in an experiment and then asked them to predict how much of the money they and others would donate, hypothetically, had they been given a particular charitable appeal after the study. People said (on average) they'd donate $2.44, and others would donate only $1.83. But when the study was run with a real request to give money, the average gift was $1.53.

In their cleverest study, the researchers described the details of the third study to a new group of subjects and asked them to predict how much money they would donate if they had been in the "real" condition, and how much money other Cornell students would donate. Once again, subjects predicted they'd be much more generous than others. But then subjects saw the actual amounts of money donated by real subjects from the third study, revealed to them one at a time (and averaging $1.53). After being given this new information, subjects were given a chance to revise their estimates, and they did. They lowered their estimates of what others would give, but they did not change their estimates of what they themselves would give. In other words, subjects used base rate information properly to revise their predictions of others, but they refused to apply it to their own self-assessments. We judge others
by their behavior, but we think we have special information about ourselves—we know what we are "really like" inside, so we can easily find ways to explain away our selfish acts and cling to the illusion that we are better than others.

Ambiguity abets the illusion. For many traits, such as leadership, there are so many ways to define it that one is free to pick the criterion that will most flatter oneself. If I'm confident, I can define leadership as confidence. If I think I'm high on people skills, I can define leadership as the ability to understand and influence people. When comparing ourselves to others, the general process is this: Frame the question (unconsciously, automatically) so that the trait in question is related to a self-perceived strength, then go out and look for evidence that you have the strength. Once you find a piece of evidence, once you have a "makes-sense" story, you are done. You can stop thinking, and revel in your self-esteem. It's no wonder, then, that in a study of 1 million American high school students, 70 percent thought they were above average on leadership ability, but only 2 percent thought they were below average. Everyone can find some skill that might be construed as related to leadership, and then find some piece of evidence that one has that skill. (College professors are less wise than high school students in this respect—94 percent of us think we do above-average work.) But when there is little room for ambiguity—how tall are you? how good are you at juggling?—people tend to be much more modest.

If the only effect of these rampant esteem-inflating biases was to make people feel good about themselves, they would not be a problem. In fact, evidence shows that people who hold pervasive positive illusions about themselves, their abilities, and their future prospects are mentally healthier, happier, and better liked than people who lack such illusions. But such biases can make people feel that they deserve more than they do, thereby setting the stage for endless disputes with other people who feel equally over-entitled.

I fought endlessly with my first-year college roommates. I had provided much of our furniture, including the highly valued refrigerator, and I did most of the work keeping our common space clean. After a while, I got tired of doing more than my share; I stopped working so hard and let the space become messy so that someone else would pick up the slack. Nobody did. But they did pick up my resentment, and it united them in their dislike of me. The next year, when we no longer lived together, we became close friends.

When my father drove me and my refrigerator up to college that first year, he told me that the most important things I was going to learn I would not learn in the classroom, and he was right. It took many more years of living with roommates, but I finally realized what a fool I had made of myself that first year. Of course I thought I did more than my share. Although I was aware of every little thing I did for the group, I was aware of only a portion of everyone else's contributions. And even if I had been correct in my accounting, I was self-righteous in setting up the accounting categories. I picked the things I cared about—such as keeping the refrigerator clean—and then gave myself an A plus in that category. As with other kinds of social comparison, ambiguity allows us to set up the comparison in ways that favor ourselves, and then to seek evidence that shows we are excellent cooperators. Studies of such "unconscious overclaiming" show that when husbands and wives estimate the percentage of housework each does, their estimates total more than 126 percent. When MBA students in a work group make estimates of their contributions to the team, the estimates total 139 percent. Whichever people form cooperative groups, which are usually of mutual benefit, self-serving biases threaten to fill group members with mutual resentment.

I'M RIGHT; YOU'RE BIASED

If spouses, colleagues, and roommates so easily descend into resentment, things get worse when people who lack affection or shared goals have to negotiate. Vast societal resources are expended on litigation, labor strikes, divorce disputes, and violence after failed peace talks because the same self-serving biases are at work fostering hypocritical indignation. In these high-pressure situations, the lawyers (real and metaphorical) are working round the clock to spin and distort the case in their clients' favor. George Loewenstein and his colleagues at Carnegie Mellon found a way to study the process by giving pairs of research subjects a real legal case to read (about a motorcycle accident in Texas), assigning one subject to play the
defendant and one the plaintiff, and then giving them real money to negotiate with. Each pair was told to reach a fair agreement and warned that, if they failed to agree, a settlement would be imposed and "court costs" deducted from the pool of money, leaving both players worse off. When both players knew which role each was to play from the start, each read the case materials differently, made different guesses about what settlement the judge in the real case had imposed, and argued in a biased way. More than a quarter of all pairs failed to reach an agreement. However, when the players didn't know which role they were to play until after they had read all the materials, they became much more reasonable, and only 10 percent of pairs failed to settle.

Recognizing that hiding negotiators' identities from them until the last minute is not an option in the real world, Loewenstein set out to find other ways to "de-bias" negotiators. He tried having subjects read a short essay about the kinds of self-serving biases that affect people in their situation to see whether subjects could correct for the biases. No dice. Although the subjects read the information to predict their opponent's behavior more accurately, they did not change their own biases at all. As Epley and Dunning had found, people really are open to information that will predict the behavior of others, but they refuse to adjust their self-assessments. In another study, Loewenstein followed the advice often given by marriage therapists to have each subject first write an essay arguing the other person's case as convincingly as possible. Even worse than no dice. The manipulation backfired, perhaps because thinking about your opponent's arguments automatically triggers additional thinking on your own part as you prepare to refute them.

One manipulation did work. When subjects read the essay about self-serving biases and were then asked to write an essay about weaknesses in their own case, their previous righteousness was shaken. Subjects in this study were just as fair-minded as those who learned their identities at the last minute. But before you get too optimistic about this technique for reducing hypocrisy, you should realize that Loewenstein was asking subjects to find weaknesses in their cases—in the positions they were arguing for—not in their characters. When you try to persuade people to look at their own personal picture of Dorian Gray, they put up a much bigger fight. Emily Pronin at Princeton and Lee Ross at Stanford have tried to help people overcome their self-serving biases by teaching them about biases and then asking, "OK, now that you know about these biases, do you want to change what you just said about yourself?" Across many studies, the results were the same: People were quite happy to learn about the various forms of self-serving bias and then apply their newfound knowledge to predict others' responses. But then self-ratings were unaffected. Even when you grab people by the lapels, shake them, and say, "Listen to me! Most people have an inflated view of themselves. Be realistic!" they refuse, muttering to themselves, "Well, other people may be biased, but I really am above average on leadership."

Pronin and Ross trace this resistance to a phenomenon they call "naive realism." Each of us thinks we see the world directly, as it really is. If we don't believe that the facts as we see them are there for all to see, therefore others should agree with us. If they don't agree, it follows either that they have not yet been exposed to the relevant facts or else that they are blinded by their interests and ideologies. People acknowledge that their own backgrounds have shaped their views, but such experiences are invariably seen as deepening one’s insights, for example, being a doctor gives a person special insight into the problems of the health-care industry. But the background of other people is used to explain their biases and covert motivations; for example, doctors think that lawyers disagree with them about tort reform not because they work with the victims of malpractice (and therefore have their own special insights) but because their self-interest biases their thinking. It just seems plausible to the naive realist, that everyone is influenced by ideology and self-interest, except for me. I see things as they are.

If I could nominate one candidate for "biggest obstacle to world peace and social harmony," it would be naive realism because it is so easily cultivated up from the individual to the group level. My group is right because we see things as they are. Those who disagree are obviously biased by their religion, their ideology, or their self-interest. Naive realism gives us a world full of good and evil, and this brings us to the most disturbing implication of the sage's advice about hypocrisy: Good and evil do not exist outside of our beliefs about them.
Satan Satisfies

One day in 1998 I received a handwritten letter from a woman in my town whom I did not know. The woman wrote about how crime, drugs, and teenage pregnancy were all spiraling out of control. Society was going downhill as Satan spread his wings. The woman invited me to come to her church and find spiritual shelter. As I read her letter, I had to agree with her that Satan had spread his wings, but only to fly away and leave us in peace. The late 1990s was a golden age. The cold war was over, democracy and human rights were spreading. South Africa had vanquished apartheid. Israelis and Palestinians were reaping the fruits of the Oslo accords, and there were encouraging signs from North Korea. Here in the United States, crime and unemployment had plummeted, the stock market was climbing ever higher, and the ensuing prosperity was promising to erase the national debt. Even cockroaches were disappearing from our cities because of widespread use of the roach poison Combat. So what on earth was she talking about?

When the moral history of the 1990s is written, it might be titled Desperately Seeking Satan. With peace and harmony ascendant, Americans seemed to be searching for substitute villains. We tried drug dealers (but then the crack epidemic waned) and child abductors (who were usually one of the parents). The cultural right vilified homosexuals; the left vilified racists and homophobes. As I thought about these various villains, including the older villains of communism and Satan himself, I realized that most of them share three properties: They are invisible (you can’t identify the evil one from appearance alone); their evil spreads by contagion, making it vital to protect impressionable young people from infection (for example from communist ideas, homosexual teachers, or stereotypes on television); and the villains can be defeated only if we all pull together as a team. It became clear to me that people want to believe they are on a mission from God, or that they are fighting for some more secular good (animals, fetuses, women’s rights), and you can’t have much of a mission without good allies and a good enemy.

The problem of evil has bedeviled many religions since their birth. If God is all good and all powerful, either he allows evil to flourish (which means he is not all good), or else he struggles against evil (which means he is not all powerful). Religions have generally chosen one of three resolutions of this paradox. One solution is straight dualism: There exists a good force and an evil force, they are equal and opposite, and they fight eternally. Human beings are part of the battleground. We were created part good, part evil, and we must choose which side we will be on. This view is clearest in religions emanating from Persia and Babylonia, such as Zoroastrianism, and the view influenced Christianity as a long-lived doctrine called Manichaeism. A second resolution is straight monism: There is one God; he created the world as it needs to be, and evil is an illusion, a view that dominated religions that developed in India. These religions hold that the entire world—or, at least, its emotional grip upon us—is an illusion, and that enlightenment consists of breaking out of the illusion. The third approach, taken by Christianity, blends monism and dualism in a way that ultimately reconciles the goodness and power of God with the existence of Satan. This argument is so complicated that I cannot understand it. Nor, apparently, can many Christians who, judging by what I hear on gospel radio stations in Virginia, seem to hold a straight Manichaean world view, according to which God and Satan are fighting an eternal war. In fact, despite the diversity of theological arguments made in different religions, concrete representations of Satan, demons, and other evil entities are surprisingly similar across continents and eras.

From a psychological perspective, Manichaeism makes perfect sense. “Our life is the creation of our mind,” as Buddha said, and our minds evolved to play Machiavellian tit for tat. We all commit selfish and shortsighted acts, but our inner lawyer ensures that we do not blame ourselves or our allies for them. We are thus convinced of our own virtue, but quick to see bias, greed, and duplicity in others. We are often correct about others’ motives, but as any conflict escalates we begin to exaggerate grossly, to weave a story in which pure virtue (our side) is in a battle with pure vice (theirs).

The Myth of Pure Evil

In the days after receiving that letter, I thought a lot about the need for evil. I decided to write an article on this need and use the tools of modern psychology to understand evil in a new way. But as soon as I started my research, I found out I was too late. By one year. A three-thousand-year-old
question had been given a complete and compelling psychological explanations the previous year by Roy Baumeister, one of today's most creative social psychologists. In *Evil: Inside Human Cruelty and Aggression*, Baumeister examined evil from the perspective of both victim and perpetrator. Taking the perpetrator's perspective, he found that people who do things we see as evil, from spousal abuse all the way to genocide, rarely think they are doing anything wrong. They almost always see themselves as responding to attacks and provocations in ways that are justified. They often think that they themselves are victims. But, of course, you can see right through this tactic; you are good at understanding the biases that others use to protect their self-esteem. The disturbing part is that Baumeister shows us our own distortions as victims, and as righteouss advocates of victims. Almost everywhere Baumeister looked in the research literature, he found that victims often shared some of the blame. Most murders result from an escalating cycle of provocation and retaliation; often, the corpse could just as easily have been the murderer. In half of all domestic disputes, both sides used violence. Baumeister points out that, even in instances of obvious police brutality, such as the infamous videotaped beating of Rodney King in Los Angeles in 1991, there is usually much more to the story than is shown on the news. (News programs gain viewers by satisfying people's need to believe that evil stalks the land.)

Baumeister is an extraordinary social psychologist, in part because in his search for truth he is unconcerned about political correctness. Sometimes evil falls out of a clear blue sky onto the head of an innocent victim, but most cases are much more complicated, and Baumeister is willing to violate the taboo against "blaming the victim" in order to understand what really happened. People usually have reasons for committing violence, and those reasons usually involve retaliation for a perceived injustice, or self-defense. This does not mean that both sides are equally to blame: Perpetrators often grossly overreact and misinterpret (using self-serving biases). But Baumeister's point is that we do have a deep need to understand violence and cruelty through what he calls "the myth of pure evil." Of this myth's many parts, the most important are that evil doers are pure in their evil motives (they have no motives for their actions beyond sadism and greed); victims are pure in their victimhood (they did nothing to bring about their victimization); and evil comes from outside and is associated with a group or force that attacks our group. Furthermore, anyone who questions the application of the myth, who dares muddy the waters of moral certainty, is in league with evil.

The myth of pure evil is the ultimate self-serving bias, the ultimate form of naive realism. And it is the ultimate cause of most long-running cycles of violence because both sides use it to look themselves into a Manichean struggle. When George W. Bush said that the 9/11 terrorists did what they did because they "hate our freedom," he showed a stunning lack of psychological insight. Neither the 9/11 hijackers nor Osama Bin Laden were particularly upset because American women can drive, vote, and wear bikinis. Rather, many Islamic extremists want to kill Americans because they are using the Myth of Pure Evil to interpret Arab history and current events. They see America as the Great Satan, the current villain in a long pageant of Western humiliation of Arab nations and peoples. They did what they did as a reaction to America's actions and impact in the Middle East, as they see it through the distortions of the Myth of Pure Evil. However horrifying it is for terrorists to lump all civilians into the category of "enemy" and then kill them indiscriminately, such actions at least make psychological sense, whereas killing because of hatred for freedom does not.

In another unsettling conclusion, Baumeister found that violence and cruelty have four main causes. The first two are obvious attributes of evil: greed/ambition (violence for direct personal gain, as in robbery) and sadism (pleasure in hurting people). But greed/ambition explains only a small portion of violence, and sadism explains almost none. Outside of children's cartoons and horror films, people almost never hurt others for the sheer joy of hurting someone. The two biggest causes of evil are two that we think are good, and that we try to encourage in our children: high self-esteem and moral idealism. Having high self-esteem doesn't directly cause violence, but when someone's high esteem is unrealistic or narcissistic, it is easily threatened by reality; in reaction to those threats, people—particularly young men—often lash out violently. Baumeister questions the usefulness of programs that try to raise children's self-esteem directly instead of by teaching...
them skills they can be proud of. Such direct enhancement can potentially foster unstable narcissism.

Threatened self-esteem accounts for a large portion of violence at the individual level, but to really get a mass atrocity going you need idealism—the belief that your violence is a means to a moral end. The major atrocities of the twentieth century were carried out largely either by men who thought they were creating a utopia or else by men who believed they were defending their homeland or tribe from attack. Idealism easily becomes dangerous because it brings with it, almost inevitably, the belief that the ends justify the means. If you are fighting for good or for God, what matters is the outcome, not the path. People have little respect for rules; we respect the moral principles that underlie most rules. But when a moral mission and legal rules are incompatible, we usually care more about the mission. The psychologist Linda Skitka finds that when people have strong moral feelings about a controversial issue—when they have a "moral mandate"—they care much less about procedural fairness in court cases. They want the "good guys" freed by any means, and the "bad guys" convicted by any means. It is thus not surprising that the administration of George W. Bush consistently argues that extra-judicial killings, indefinite imprisonment without trial, and harsh physical treatment of prisoners are legal and proper steps in fighting the Manichaean "war on terror."

**Finding the Great Way**

In philosophy classes, I often came across the idea that the world is an illusion. I never really knew what that meant, although it sounded deep. But after two decades studying moral psychology, I think I finally get it. The anthropologist Clifford Geertz wrote that "man is an animal suspended in webs of significance that he himself has spun." That is, the world we live in is not really one made of rocks, trees, and physical objects; it is a world of insulas, opportunities, status symbols, betrayals, saints, and sinners. All of these are human creations, which, though real in their own way, are not real in the way that rocks and trees are real. These human creations are like fairies in J. M. Barrie's *Peter Pan*. They exist only if you believe in them. They are the Matrix (from the movie of that name); they are a consensual hallucination.

The inner lawyer, the rose-colored mirror, naive realism, and the myth of pure evil—these mechanisms all conspire to weave for us a web of significance upon which angels and demons fight it out. Our ever-judging minds then give us constant flashes of approval and disapproval, along with the certainty that we are on the side of the angels. From this vantage point it all seems so silly, all this moralism, righteousness, and hypocrisy. It's beyond silly; it is tragic, for it suggests that human beings will never achieve a state of lasting peace and harmony. So what can you do about it?

The first step is to see it as a game and stop taking it so seriously. The great lesson that comes out of ancient Hinduism is that life as we experience it is a game called "samsara." It is a game in which each person plays out his "dharma," his role or part in a giant play. In the game of samsara, good things happen to you, and you are happy. Then bad things happen, and you are sad or angry. And so it goes, until you die. Then you are reborn back into it, and it repeats. The message of the Bhagavad Gita (a central text of Hinduism) is that you can't quit the game entirely; you have a role to play in the functioning of the universe, and you must play that role. But you should do it in the right way, without being attached to the "fruits" or outcomes of your action. The god Krishna says:

I love the man who hates not nor exults, who mourns not nor desires. . . . who is the same to friend and foe, [the same] whether he be respected or despised, the same in heat and cold, in pleasure and in pain, who has put away attachment and remains unmoved by praise or blame . . . contented with whatever comes his way.

Buddha went a step further. He, too, counseled indifference to the ups and downs of life, but he urged that we quit the game entirely. Buddhism is a set of practices for escaping samsara and the endless cycle of rebirth. Though divided on whether to retreat from the world or engage with it, Buddhists all agree on the importance of training the mind to stop its incessant
Judgmentalism is indeed a disease of the mind: it leads to anger, torment, and conflict. But it is also the mind’s normal condition—the elephant is always evaluating, always saying “Like it” or “Don’t like it.” So how can you change your automatic reactions? You know by now that you can’t simply resolve to stop judging others or to stop being a hypocrite. But, as Buddha taught, the rider can gradually learn to tame the elephant, and meditation is one way to do so. Meditation has been shown to make people calmer, less reactive to the ups and downs and petty provocations of life. Meditation is the Eastern way of training yourself to take things philosophically.

Cognitive therapy works, too. In Feeling Good, a popular guide to cognitive therapy, David Burns has written a chapter on cognitive therapy for anger. He advises using many of the same techniques that Aaron Beck used for depression: Write down your thoughts, learn to recognize the distortions in your thoughts, and then think of a more appropriate thought. Burns focuses on the should statements we carry around—ideas about how the world should work, and about how people should treat us. Violations of these should statements are the major causes of anger and resentment. Burns also advises empathy: In a conflict, look at the world from your opponent’s point of view, and you’ll see that she is not entirely crazy.

Although I agree with Burns’s general approach, the material I have reviewed in this chapter suggests that, once anger comes into play, people find it extremely difficult to empathize with and understand another’s perspective. A better place to start is, as Jesus advised, with yourself and the log in your own eye. (Baumeister and Leventhal both found that debiasing occurred only when subjects were forced to look at themselves.) And you will see the log only if you set out on a deliberate and effortful quest to look for it. Try this now: Think of a recent interpersonal conflict with someone you care about and then find one way in which your behavior was not exemplary. Maybe you did something insensitive (even if you had a right to do it), or hurtful (even if you meant well), or inconsistent with your principles (even though you can readily justify it). When you first catch sight of a fault in yourself, you’ll likely hear frantic arguments from your inner lawyer excusing you and blaming others, but try not to listen. You are on a mission to find at least one thing that you did wrong. When you extract a splinter it hurts, briefly, but then you feel relief, even pleasure. When you find a fault in yourself it will hurt, briefly, but if you keep going and acknowledge the fault, you are likely to be rewarded with a flash of pleasure that is mixed, oddly, with a hint of pride. It is the pleasure of taking responsibility for your own behavior. It is the feeling of honor.

Finding fault with yourself is also the key to overcoming the hypocrisy and judgmentalism that damage so many valuable relationships. The instant you see some contribution you made to a conflict, your anger soars—but that is just a bit, but enough that you might be able to acknowledge some merit on the other side. You can still believe you are right and the other person is wrong, but if you can move to believing that you are mostly right, and your opponent is mostly wrong, you have the basis for an effective and nonhumiliating apology. You can take a small piece of the disagreement and say, “I should not have done X, and I can see why you felt Y.” Then, by the power of reciprocity, the other person will likely feel a strong urge to say, “Yes, I was really upset by X. But I guess I shouldn’t have done P, so I can see why you felt Q.” Reciprocity amplified by self-serving biases drove you apart back when you were matching insults or hostile gestures, but you can turn the process around and use reciprocity to end a conflict and save a relationship.

The human mind may have been shaped by evolutionary processes to play Machiavellian tit for tat, and it seems to come equipped with cognitive processes that predispose us to hypocrisy, self-righteousness, and moralistic
confront. But sometimes, by knowing the mind’s structure and strategies, we can step out of the ancient game of social manipulation and enter into a game of our choosing. By seeing the log in your own eye you can become less biased, less moralistic, and therefore less inclined toward argument and conflict. You can begin to follow the perfect way, the path to happiness that leads through acceptance, which is the subject of the next chapter.

The Pursuit of Happiness

Good men, at all times, surrender in truth all attachments.
The holy spend not idle words on things of desire. When
pleasure or pain comes to them, the wise feel above pleasure
and pain.

—BUDDHA

Do not seek to have events happen as you want them to, but
instead want them to happen as they do happen, and your
life will go well.

—EPICURE

If money or power could buy happiness, then the author of the Old Testa-
ment book of Ecclesiastes should have been overjoyed. The text assigns
itself to a king in Jerusalem, who looks back on his life and his search
for happiness and fulfillment. He tried at one point to “make a test of plea-
sure,” by seeking happiness in his riches:

I made great works: I built houses and planted vineyards for myself. I
made myself gardens and parks, and planted in them all kinds of fruit
trees. . . . I also had great possessions of beasts and flocks, more than any
who had been before me in Jerusalem. I also gathered for myself silver

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